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Legal Services and the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984
Michael K. Grace*
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (TTA), I passed in the last days of the 98th
Congress, marks a major effort to deal with the difficult problems associated with
liberalization of international trade in services. 2 While the TTA does not give the
President additional negotiating authority to enter into agreements on interna-
tional trade in services,3 it does articulate new negotiating objectives for such
international agreements. The TTA is the first piece of trade legislation whose
negotiating objectives focus primarily on the reduction of barriers to international
trade in services.
Although Congressional concern for the legal services industry 4 was not a
primary motive in the enactment of the TTA, 5 reduction of restrictions on foreign
legal practice is an attractive goal as it would further the overseas expansion of
* Class of 1986, University of Michigan Law School.
I. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C.A. and 22 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as TTA].
2. The TTA defines services as "economic activities whose outputs are other than tangible goods.
Such term includes, but is not limited to, banking, insurance, transportation, communications and
data processing, retail and wholesale trade, advertising, accounting, construction, design and en-
gineering, management consulting, real estate, professional services, entertainment, education,
health care, and tourism." Id. at § 306(a)(5), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2114b(5) (West Supp. 1985).
3. The original authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries to reduce barriers to trade
in services is included in section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1982
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982)). This authority is limited to nontariff barriers to
trade in services and expires on January 2. 1988. 19 U.S.C. § § 2112(b),(g)(3).
4. For the purpose of this note, "legal services" are defined as activities such as offering legal
advice, making court appearances on behalf of clients, and holding oneself out as an attorney, that are
performed for remuneration and by licensed members of state bar associations. See Spivak v. Sachs,
16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
5. U.S. interests in international finance and data transmission were the chief proponents of the
TTA provisions relating to services. For a list of 60 companies and industry associations that
supported S. 144, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), which in amended form became Title III of the TTA,
see 130 CONG. REC. S2228 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
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the U.S. economy. 6 In 1984, however, the tenth amendment posed potential
problems to the negotiation of such reductions. Legal services in the United
States are regulated by the individual states and play a crucial role in the admin-
istration of justice by state governments. 7 Consequently, prior to the Supreme
Court's 1985 decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,8
an international agreement affecting the ability of the states to regulate this area
would likely have been subject to a tenth amendment, state sovereignty chal-
lenge. Garcia seems to have mooted this potential objection, apparently clearing
the way for an agreement as comprehensive as Congress is willing and able to
endorse.
Part I of this note outlines the major nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in
services. Part II discusses the provisions of the Trade and Tariff Act that are
aimed at the reduction of those barriers. Part III examines the applicability of the
TTA to legal services and the potential limitations on the provisions of an interna-
tional agreement for that particular service industry. It concludes that concerns
over state sovereignty, while no longer posing a constitutional obstacle to an
international agreement on trade in services, will remain an important political
force in the shaping of such an agreement.
I. NONTARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE IN SERVICES
Over the past decade, world trade in services grew at an annual rate of 17
percent9 and now represents nearly one-quarter of all international commerce. ' 0
Despite overall trade deficits, II the United States has run large surpluses in trade
in services since 1975.12 From 1972 to 1980, however, the U.S. share of world
trade in services declined from 20 to 15 percent. 13 Members of Congress have
6. See Calder, Opening Japan, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1982, at 82, 95.
7. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("['L]awyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice .....
8. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
9. 130 CONG. REC. H 11022 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Rep. Florio) [hereinafter cited as
Rep. Florio Statement].
10. See Kristof, New Era in Service Exports: Trade Bill Gives Support, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984,
at DI.
II. In 1984, for example, the U.S. trade deficit was $123 billion, a record high. Hershey, Shultz
Outlines Steps to Aid World Economy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1985, at Dl.
12. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98TH CONG., lsT SESS., RECIPROCAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT ACT, 1983: WRITTEN COMMENTS ON H.R. 1571, AND SERVICE INDUS-
TRIES COMMERCE DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1983: WRIrEN COMMENTS ON H.R. 2848, at 83 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as HousE COMMENTS ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES].
13. Rep. Florio Statement, supra note 9, at H 11022.
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attributed much of this decline to intervention by foreign governments in service
markets, both to protect their service industries from U.S. competition and to
assist their firms in export expansion. ' 4
Unlike the readily noticeable tariff barriers to international trade in goods,
most barriers to international trade in services are subtle, technical, and service
specific. Nontariff barriers such as licensing, technical standards, quotas, and
exchange controls are difficult to evaluate and compare. This makes reciprocal
concessions in international negotiations nearly impossible to achieve. 1 In addi-
tion, the regulation of many services reflects deeply held and nationally shared
political and ethical values. Regulations governing the licensing of lawyers, for
example, are founded on cultural values and thus may be less susceptible to
international control than regulations governing goods. 16 The importance and
diversity of the values underlying some NTBs and the difficulty of analyzing
their impact on international trade suggest that this type of trade restriction will,
for the foreseeable future, continue to be a serious problem.
Regulatory burdens to international trade in services appear in four varieties:
(1) outright prohibition of establishment or access to markets; (2) government
regulation discriminating against imports of services; (3) government subsidies
for domestic service industries; and (4) discriminatory government procurement
policies. 17 In the first category are the outright prohibitions of the importation of
ready-made television commercials by the governments of Argentina, Australia,
and Canada. The second category includes government restrictions on the use of
international telecommunications lines by firms in Brazil, and the Federal Re-
public of Germany.' 8 Governments regularly provide subsidies to domestic ser-
vice industries, such as below-market rate loans, export financing, and discount
sales by government-owned enterprises. Discriminatory government procure-
14. See id.; 130 CONG. REC. S 11387-88 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984) (statement of Sen. lnouye). In
1983, the trade surplus in services narrowed to $30 billion, nearly a 25 percent decline from 1979. Id.
15. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 119 (1985).
16. The number of lawyers in different societies varies greatly. In 1980, for example, there were
11,475 lawyers (bengoshi) licensed in Japan compared to an estimated 400,000 lawyers in the United
States. Fukuda, Japan, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
204 (D. Campbell ed. 1982). Moreover, their roles differ in important respects. Japanese bengoshi are
primarily litigation lawyers, while U.S. lawyers engage in business planning and legal counseling as
well as litigation. Id. Since there is no international consensus on the role lawyers should play in
business and in society generally, constructing an international regime to regulate transnational legal
services will be a difficult task.
17. See HOUSE COMMENTS ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES, supra note 12, at 128-30 (statement of the
lnt'l Chamber of Comm.); see also Service Industries Development Act, Hearings on S. 3003 Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1980)
(statement of Geza Feketekuty, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Policy Development) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings, Service Industries].
18. See HOUSE COMMENTS ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES, supra note 12, at 85.
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ment policies also aid national firms to the detriment of potential U.S.
exporters. 19
II. THE TTA AND TRADE IN SERVICES
The TTA does not change the President's negotiating authority to reduce NTBs
to international trade in services. 2 0 Rather, it adds focus and urgency to existing
authority in two ways. First, the TTA indicates the U.S. desire to negotiate
international agreements designed to reduce barriers to trade in services. Second,
the TTA asserts the willingness of the U.S. to retaliate against service imports
from countries discriminating against U.S. service exports.
The negotiating objectives set forth in the TTA demonstrate the U.S. interest in
negotiating trade agreements on services. 2 The negotiating goals represent the
19. The degree of government intervention in international trade is surprisingly large. Barriers to
international trade in services include "national preferences for local products, industrial targeting
policies, export credit subsidies, regional investment incentives, [and] closed national distribution
systems." Legislation Authorizing International Trade Negotiations: Hearings on H.R. 6773 and
H.R. 5519 Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982) (statement of Raymond J. Waldmann, Asst. Secretary
of Commerce for Int'l Economic Policy).
20. The House staff summary of the conference report exaggerates the impact of the TTA when it
states: "The conference agreement for the first time gives the President specific negotiating authority
with respect to international trade in services." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF TRADE AND TARIFF ACT 19 (Comm. Print
1984) [hereinafter cited as STAFF SUMMARY]. The President has authority under section 102 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982), to enter into trade agreements to reduce or remove
nontariff barriers to trade in goods and services. Under this authority the President may submit the
international agreement to Congress for expedited consideration without the possibility of amend-
ment. For the procedural requirements that the President must meet in order to qualify a trade
agreement for such "fast-track" consideration, see Trade Act of 1974, §§ 102, 151, 19 U.S.C. §§
2112, 2191 (1982). While the TTA did not alter the President's negotiating authority to enter into
international agreements governing NTBs, it does provide the President with limited authority to
enter into agreements to reduce tariff barriers to goods and services. See TTA, supra note I, at § 401,
19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West Supp. 1985).
21. Section 305 of the TTA provides:
Principal United States negotiating objectives under section 102 shall be-
(A) to reduce or to eliminate barriers to, or other distortions of, international trade in
services (particularly United States service sector trade in foreign markets), including barriers
that deny national treatment and restrictions on the establishment and operation in such
markets; and
(B) to develop internationally agreed rules, including dispute settlement procedures,
which-
(i) are consistent with the commercial policies of the United States, and
(ii) will reduce or eliminate such barriers or distortions and help ensure open international
trade in services.
TTA, supra note 1, at § 305, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2114a(a)(l) (West Supp. 1985).
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first explicit statement of congressional intent regarding international trade in
services. They call for the reduction or elimination of barriers to such trade and
the development of a set of international rules, including dispute settlement
procedures, to govern it. "[Olpen international trade in services" is the avowed
end of U.S. trade policy.22 This trade objective reflects increased awareness in
Congress that the United States, with "the world's leading service-industry econ-
omy," 23 has the most to lose in an international trade regime dominated by
protectionist pressures.
In addition, by amending and adding to the President's retaliatory authority
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,24 the TTA indicates the desire of
Congress that his authority be used more aggressively in the services area.
Section 301 permits the President to suspend trade agreements and to impose
duties or other restrictions on U.S. imports of goods or services in retaliation
against governments that engage in actions harmful to U.S. exports.25
The TTA contains three provisions relating to the President's section 301
retaliatory authority. First, it clarifies the President's power to exercise his re-
taliatory authority against any service imports from an offending country,2 6 as
well as against the service or product affected by the action of the foreign
government. 27 The Trade Act of 1974 provided the President with broad authority
but did not specifically permit retaliation against foreign services unassociated
with the foreign protectionist action."2 The TTA unequivocally gives the Presi-
dent the power to respond to harmful foreign trade policies and practices in this
manner.
Second, the TTA adds a subsection to section 301 that gives the President the
authority to restrict "service sector access authorizations" 29 governed by federal
law, notwithstanding the existing authority of independent federal regulatory
22. Id
23. Cohen, Economic Relations with Other Advanced Industrial States, in EAGLE DEFIANT 122
(K. Oye ed. 1983).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
25. Id.
26. The President may retaliate when a foreign country acts in a manner that is inconsistent with its
trade obligations to the United States or discriminates against and is burdensome to U.S. commerce.
The President may impose restrictions that affect all countries equally or only the offending country.
Whether the President imposes general or country-specific restrictions, he has the flexibility to restrict
the services initially affected by the foreign measures, as well as all other service imports. TTA,
supra note 1, at § 304(a), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a) (West Supp. 1985).
27. Id.
28. See STAFF SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 19.
29. A service sector access authorization is "any license, permit, order, or other authorization,
issued under the authority of Federal law, that permits a foreign supplier of services access to the
United States market in a service sector concerned." TTA, supra note 1, at § 304(0(2), 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 2411(e)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
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agencies. 30 This authority applies only to retaliation against foreign restrictions
on services. 3 Under this subsection, the President can retaliate against foreign
protectionism against U.S. service exports by refusing to grant or renew licenses
to foreign firms desiring to provide services that require federal licenses. 32
Third, the TTA clarifies the President's authority under section 301(b) to im-
pose retaliatory duties or other restrictions on imported services regardless of
"any other [conflicting] provisions of law.'' 33 This provision applies only to
retaliation against importation of services and ensures that the President's author-
ity overrides other federal and state regulatory authority.
While these three provisions do not add significantly to the President's re-
taliatory authority, they suggest that Congress increasingly views the threat of
retaliation as an important means of reducing barriers to trade in services. These
provisions permit quicker and more flexible action against foreign protectionist
policies and bolster the President's negotiating status vis-A-vis foreign govern-
ments. Congress also intended the President to exercise his authority more fre-
quently.34 By authorizing the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
initiate his own investigations to determine whether to advise the President to use
section 301,15 the Congress is encouraging the Executive Branch to defend more
vigorously U.S. trade interests.
30. The added subsection to section 301 reads:
(1) In general.- Notwithstanding any other provision of law governing any service sector
access authorization ... the President may-
(A) restrict, in the manner and to the extent the President deems appropriate, the terms and
conditions of any such authorization, or
(B) deny the issuance of any such authorization.
(2) Affected authorizations.- Actions under paragraph (1) shall apply only with respect to
service sector access authorizations granted, or applications therefor pending, on or after the
date on which-
(A) a petition is filed [with the USTRI, or
(B) a determination to initiate an investigation is made by the IUSTR]....
Id. at § 304(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c) (West Supp. 1985).
31. CoMMIT-rEE OF CONFERENCE, TRADE AND TARIFF ACT OF 1984, JoINT EXPLANATORY STATE-
MENT, H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1984) [hereinafter cited asTTA EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT].
32. However, only foreign persons not having a pending application for or currently holding a
federal license at the time of the request for presidential intervention could be so restricted. See TTA,
supra note I, at § 304(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
33. Id. at § 304(b)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
34. Congress appears to have been persuaded by the arguments made by some groups that the
United States is losing the battle in international trade because of the President's reluctance to retaliate
decisively against foreign trade barriers. See, e.g., HOUSE COMMENTS ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
supra note 12, at 55 (statement of the AFL-CIO) ("In our view, U.S. problems in international trade
result in large measure from a lack of political will, not inadequacy of law .... [E]xisting authority
to take action lunder Section 301] has for the most part been ignored by the executive branch.").
35. See TTA, supra note 1, at § 304(d)(1), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2412(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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Other provisions of the TTA mandate the collection and analysis of trade data,
providing Congress with the information necessary to more effectively pressure
the President to exercise his retaliatory authority. The TTA instructs the Secretary
of Commerce to collect information on U.S. exports of services and to establish a
service industries program to promote U.S. service exports.3 6 Furthermore, the
USTR is to identify and analyze barriers to international trade in services and
make annual reports to Congress on the "trade-distorting impact" of the barriers
discovered and on the action taken to remove them. 37 These new programs and
reporting requirements equip Congress to oversee the President's implementation
of the trade legislation and furnish the President with the trade data necessary to
support retaliation against foreign NTBs and negotiations with foreign govern-
ments for their removal.
III. APPLICATION OF THE TTA TO LEGAL SERVICES
A. Statutory and Constitutional Issues
Legal services are almost certainly within the scope of the negotiating objec-
tives of the TTA. Services are generally defined as "economic activities whose
outputs are other than tangible goods. Such term includes ... professional
services." 3 While this definition appears in the section of the TTA prescribing
measures to promote trade in services, Congress intended that the definition also
be used in connection with the President's retaliatory authority under section
301.39 In the absence of a definition of services in the Trade Act of 1974, the
definition in the TTA may be extended to the President's negotiating authority as
well. 40
Professional services are not defined by the TTA, but Congress received testi-
mony from the Office of the USTR that referred to legal services as part of
professional services. 4' In addition, Congress passed the TTA knowing that the
36. Id. at § 306(a), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2114b (West Supp. 1985).
37. Id. at § 303, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West Supp. 1985).
38. See supra note 2.
39. The definition of services is contained in section 306, which instructs the Secretary of
Commerce to gather data on international trade in services. See TTA, supra note I, at § 306, 19
U.S.C.A. § 2114b (West Supp. 1985). But the Conference Committee offered the following additional
comment:
The Conferees do not intend that the definition of services which appears in section 306 of the
Conference Agreement to be exhaustive. Instead, it should be referred to and used as guidance
in determining what services means for purposes of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
amended by the Conference Agreement.
TTA EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 31, at 149.
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(g)(3) (1982).
41. See Hearings, Service Industries, supra note 17, at 23 (statement by Geza Feketekuty, As-
sistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Policy Development); see also id. at 108 (Congressional Research Service
report).
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United States and Israel had engaged in discussions aimed at liberalizing bilateral
trade in services, including legal services. 42 Thus, it is likely that Congress
intended to include legal services within the scope of the President's negotiating
authority.
Although unlikely, an agreement on trade in legal services negotiated under the
TTA might face a tenth amendment challenge. 43 There are two reasons, however,
why such a challenge will probably fail. First, the case of Missouri v. Holland44
suggests that the power of the Chief Executive to enter into an international
agreement is not restricted by the tenth amendment. Second, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 45 overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 46 eliminates substantive tenth
amendment challenges to the exercise of federal power. The TTA itself contains a
provision that illustrates the reasoning of the Garcia decision in a particularly
pointed way.
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court rejected a tenth amendment chal-
lenge to a federal statute implementing a treaty protecting migratory birds. The
Court first noted that, since the power to make treaties is expressly delegated to
the federal government in article II of the Constitution, 47 the literal proscriptions
of the tenth amendment were inapplicable. 48 In addition, the Court held that the
validity of an implementing statute is determined by the validity of the treaty, not
by whether the statute would be constitutional in the absence of the treaty. The
treaty at issue violated no specific constitutional provisions, nor was it "forbid-
den by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the tenth amend-
ment." ' 49 The Court emphasized the strong national interest in protecting
migratory birds and the tenuous nature of the claim of title to the birds on which
42. See Pine, U.S. -Israel Accord on Trade in Services Could Be Model in Future GATT Talks, Wall
St. J., Oct. 12, 1984, at 33. The U.S.-Israel Trade Agreement, which eliminates all tariffs on trade
between the two countries over ten years, was signed in Washington, D.C., on April 22, 1985. See
Tolchin, U.S. Signs Trade Pact with Israel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at 34.
43. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
44. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
45. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
46. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
48. 252 U.S. at 432. In Reid v. Covert, the Court explained this analysis:
[Holland] carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsistent with any specific
provision of the Constitution. The Court was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which
reserves to the States or the people all power not delegated to the National Government. To the
extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the people and the States have dele-
gated their power to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.
354 U.S. 1, 18 (1956) (footnote omitted).
49. 252 U.S. at 434.
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the state based its assertion of regulatory power. In short, the Court viewed the
tenth amendment as a limitation on the exercise of federal power in federal-state
relations, not in international relations. 50
After Missouri v. Holland, the Court generally did not view the tenth amend-
ment as an important limitation on federal power, even in the context of domestic
legislation. 5 In National League of Cities v. Usery, 52 however, the Court breathed
new life into the amendment, holding that it constituted an affirmative limit to the
exercise of Congressional powers under the commerce clause. The Court held
that state employees were not protected by the wage and hour regulations of the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the Court, federal regulation of
state employment policies and other traditional state activities and functions
would "impair the States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.' ""
National League of Cities may have indicated a willingness on the part of at
least some members of the Court to reinvigorate tenth amendment limitations on
international agreements as well as domestic legislation. 14 If so, an international
50. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1972). Henkin notes:
Missouri v. Holland. . . did not say that there were no limitations on the Treaty Power in favor
of the States, only that there were none in any 'invisible radiation' from the Tenth Amend-
ment. The Constitution probably protects some few States' rights, activities, and properties
against any federal invasion, even by treaty.
Id.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that the tenth amendment is
not an affirmative limit on federal power, but merely states a "truism" that the states retain all powers
not given to the federal government or reserved to the people).
52. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
53. Id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). Fry upheld the
President's power under federal legislation to impose national wage and price controls in a national
economic emergency. Modifying National League of Cities, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Real. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), provides a four-part test for state immunity from federal regula-
tion: states must be regulated as states; the matters regulated must be "indisputably 'attribute[s] of
state sovereignty'; the states must show that compliance with federal law would "directly impair
their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions'; and the
federal interest must not "be such that it justifies state submission." 452 U.S. at 287, 288 & n.29
(quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 852).
54. While National League of Cities held that the tenth amendment limits Congressional power
under the commerce clause, Justice Rehnquist voiced broad concerns about state sovereignty that also
imply a general limitation on federal power, including, perhaps, the treaty power: "[T]here are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." National League
of Cities, 426 U.S. 845. Rehnquist's lone dissent in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 53
U.S.L.W. 4238 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985) (N.H. residency requirement for bar admission violates priv-
ileges and immunities clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 2), is indicative of his special emphasis on
state autonomy:
ITihe practice of law is-almost by definition-fundmentally different from those occupa-
tions that are practiced across state lines without significant deviation from State to State. The
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agreement to reduce barriers to transnational legal practice may well have posed
constitutional problems. Applying the National League of Cities test to such an
agreement, a court might have reasoned that the states have a long-standing and
fundamental interest in regulating the practice of law within their borders. This
interest stems from the central role lawyers play in the administration of justice, a
primary function of government.55 To protect their citizens and the integrity of
their judicial system, states must be concerned with and have the ability to
monitor the ethical character and professional skills of lawyers. 5 6
The decision of the Court in Garcia makes this argument irrelevant for pur-
poses of a tenth amendment challenge. The Court concluded, over strong dis-
sent,57 that the substantive standards outlined in National League of Cities and
subsequent cases were unworkable, inflexible, and inconsistent with the found-
ers' view of federalism.1 8 According to the majority, states are protected from
improper regulation by the procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system, not the tenth amendment as interpreted by the judiciary:5 9 "The
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated. "60
B. The TFA and the Garcia Decision
The intense political bargaining that is likely to take place when a proposed
agreement on legal services is put before Congress illustrates the Garcia concep-
fact that each State is free, in a large number of areas, to establish independently of the other
States its own laws for the governance of its citizens, is a fundmental precept of our Constitu-
tion that, I submit, is of equal stature with the need for the States to form a cohesive union.
Id. at 4242.
55. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
56. A court persuaded by these arguments might distinguish Holland by noting the significantly
greater state interest in regulating lawyers as opposed to protecting wildlife. On the other hand, the
need for liberalization of international trade in services might be the kind of strong federal interest
justifying state submission under the National League of Cities standard. Even under National
League of Cities, an exception to the tenth amendment protection of states from federal authority is
possible if "collective action by the National Government" is required, as during a national emer-
gency. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853.
57. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented. Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor openly predicted the eventual return of the Court to the National League of Cities
standard. See 53 U.S.L.W. at 4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 53 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 4136.
59. Id. at 4141.
60. Id. at 4142. Justice Powell, in dissent, states that the substantive interpretation of the tenth
amendment in National League of Cities involved a balancing test between "the strength of the
federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach."
Id. at 4144 n.5. He asserts that the political pressure of the states is insufficient protection against the
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tion of how state interests are reflected in national legislation.61 In the case of
agreements negotiated under the TTA, the statute itself explicitly requires the
consideration of state concerns that the Garcia opinion indicates is an inherent
part of congressional debate prior to legislative action.
An international agreement on trade in legal services could take many forms,
some less intrusive into state regulation of legal services than others. For exam-
ple, state participation in an agreement to liberalize restrictions on the practice of
law by foreigners might, by the terms of the agreement, be optional. 62 Alter-
natively, if national uniformity was necessary to conclude an agreement with
another government, an accord might involve the extension of national treat-
ment63 to foreigners. 64 A more comprehensive scheme might create either a
federal licensing regime for foreign lawyers or a federal bar with its own rules on
the admission of domestic and foreign lawyers. 6 The particular provisions of
each type of agreement would call into play different state interests and varying
levels of state resistance.
State bar associations will doubtless have strongly held views on any agree-
ment that limits their regulatory authority. 66 The Garcia view assumes, probably
correctly, that these views will be forcefully expressed before Congress and will
influence Congressional consideration of proposed agreements.
In drafting the TTA, Congress recognized the states' traditional regulatory
authority over many service industries and the importance of state participation in
and approval of international agreements that might affect that authority. The
TTA instructs the President to consult with state governments in developing
negotiating proposals, sharing information on trade in services, implementing
trade agreements, and exercising retaliatory authority against foreign imports of
encroachment of federal power in areas central to state concerns, id. at 4145 n.9 and that "[tihe States'
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace." Id. at
4145.
61. For the Garcia Court's view of the influence of the states in the national political process, see
53 U.S.L.W. at 4141-42.
62. Friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, for example, frequently have been ratified
subject to a reservation applying provisions of the treaty only to the extent that they are not inconsis-
tent with existing state regulation of certain professions. See L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 392 n.66.
63. The principle of national treatment provides that contracting parties to a treaty accord to
nationals of other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that accorded to their own
nationals. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 art. 3.
64. This was the approach in the recent U.S.-Israel agreement. See Pine, supra note 42.
65. No specific proposal has yet been advanced for a federal licensing regime exclusively for
foreign lawyers. For a proposal for a federal bar for U.S. attorneys, see Comisky & Patterson, The
Case for a Federally Created National Bar by Rule or by Legislation, 55 TEMP. L. Q. 945 (1982).
66. See, e.g., Young, A National Bar? No! 54 FLA. B. J. 109, 110 (1980) (argues that "the growth
of interstate law practice must be balanced with the needs of the states to regulate the practice of law
and to help control local economic conditions").
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services. 67 The President is to establish one or more intergovernmental policy
advisory committees to coordinate federal-state consultations. 68
Thus, the legitimate state interest in regulating the legal profession will proba-
bly be recognized in the process of negotiating and approving an international
agreement on trade in legal services, not only through the normal functioning of
the federal system, as described in Garcia, but also through the application of the
TTA's intergovernmental consultation provision. Such intergovernmental con-
sultation will allow the states to raise with the President and his negotiators the
arguments that might have been raised in court before the Garcia decision re-
jected the substantive interpretation of the tenth amendment. In this new, stat-
utorily mandated forum, the states will be able to emphasize the uninterrupted
history of court-approved state regulation of the legal profession, 69 as well as the
central role of attorneys in the administration of justice within state legal
systems. 70
67. Section § 306(c)(2)(A) provides:
The President shall, as he deems appropriate-
(i) consult with State governments on issues of trade policy, including negotiating objec-
tives and implementation of trade agreements, affecting the regulatory authority of non-
Federal governments, or their procurement of goods and services;
(ii) establish one or more intergovernmental policy advisory committees on trade which
shall serve as a principal forum in which State and local governments may consult with the
Federal Government with respect to the matters described in clause (i); and
(iii) provide to State and local governments and to United States service industries, upon
their request, advice, assistance, and (except as may be otherwise prohibited by law) data,
analyses, and information concerning United States policies on international trade in services.
TTA, supra note I, at § 306(c)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. 2114c(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see also id. at §
304(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985) (requiring that the USTR consult with state
governments before the President takes action restricting services which are subject to state
regulation).
68. TTA, supra note I, at §§ 306(c)(2)(A)(ii), 306(c)(2)(B)(ii), 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2114c(2)(A)(ii),
2155(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
69. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("Admission to practice in a State and before its courts necessarily belongs to that
State."). Another argument for limiting or at least closely scrutinizing an agreement on trade in legal
services is that the control over the admission to the bar and discipline and disbarment of lawyers has
traditionally been the responsibility of the judiciary: "[I]t has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856). No separation of powers argument,
however, has ever been used successfully to limit the treaty power. L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 152.
These arguments were eroded by the recent Supreme Court decision in Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 53 U.S.L.W. 4238 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985), in which a 8-1 majority declared that
New Hampshire's residency requirement for membership in the state bar violates the privileges and
immunities clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
70. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The TTA, Congress' most recent attempt to deal with the growing problems of
nontariff barriers to international trade in services, also provides impetus toward
the negotiation of agreements to liberalize restrictions on transnational legal
practice. Because of the recent Garcia decision, the tenth amendment no longer
poses a possible restriction on the provisions of such an agreement. The agree-
ment will be limited only by the ability of the states and their bar associations to
convince Congress and the President to respect the traditional role of the states in
regulating legal services. States may express their concern about national and
international regulation of legal services in the intergovernmental policy advisory
committees mandated by the TTA and in Congress itself.
